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INTRODUCTION
ESPITE much turmoil in the health care industry, the past Sur-
vey year was a relatively quiet one for health law developments
in Texas, even for a non-legislative year. To some extent, the
year has been at least as notable for the cases that were not decided as for
the ones that were. One important case-Ramirez v. McIntyre'-was de-
* Associate Professor, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University; of
counsel, Haynes and Boone, LLP, Dallas. My thanks and sincere appreciation go to Jen-
nifer Teague, Class of 2003, and Sharlyn Walling, University of Michigan Law School, Class
of 2004, for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Ramirez v. McIntyre, 59 S.W.3d 821 (Tex. App.-Austin, 2001, pet. granted)
(holding that whether a physician who did not bill for emergency services was nonetheless
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cided by the Austin Court of Appeals during the early part of the current
Survey year and was significant enough to be included in last year's Texas
Survey. 2 The case had been at the Supreme Court of Texas for fourteen
months before it was argued, 3 however, and a decision is probably still
months away. A similar fate appears to have befallen a case argued to
the supreme court on the April 3, 2002:4 HCA, Inc. v. Miller ex rel.




In 1999, the legislature enacted chapter 33 of the Family Code, a "pa-
rental-notification" law that requires physicians to notify parents of a mi-
nor at least forty-eight hours before performing an abortion.6 The
notification requirement does not apply, however, if an immediate abor-
tion is needed to save the life of the minor or to protect her from serious
bodily harm,7 or if the minor has obtained a judicial bypass of the notifi-
cation requirement. 8 The judicial bypass procedure requires the trial
court to rule on the minor's application for bypass and to "issue written
findings of fact and conclusions of law not later than 5 p.m. on the second
business day after the date the application is filed with the court."9 Fail-
precluded from invoking the protection of Texas' Good Samaritan law was a disputed
question of fact that made summary judgment inappropriate).
2. See Thomas Wm. Mayo, Health Care Law, 55 SMU L. REV. 1113, 1121-28 (2002).
3. See docket sheet for McIntyre v. Ramirez, Tex. No. 01-1203, available at http://
www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/FILES/SCT/01/01-1203.HTM (last accessed on March 23,
2003).
4. See docket sheet for S.A.M. ex rel. Miller v. HCA, Inc., Tex. No. 01-0079, available
at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/FILES/SCT/01/01-0079.HTM (last accessed on
March 23, 2003). The petition was filed with the supreme court on January 29, 2001.
5. HCA, Inc. v. Miller ex rel. Miller, 36 S.W.3d 187 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2000, pet. granted) (reversing a $60 million judgment against the defendant hospital and
holding that the hospital had a duty to resuscitate the newborn, and the parents had no
legal right to withhold their consent to resuscitation). This case was discussed in Mayo,
supra note 2, at 1117-20. Although the author contributed research and analysis for the
brief filed by the hospital defendants both in the court of appeals and the supreme court,
the comments in this article are mine alone and should not be attributed in any way to the
defendants.
6. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 33.002 (Vernon 2002). A guardian or managing con-
servator may also be notified. Id.
7. Id. § 33.002(a)(4).
8. Id. § 33.002(a)(2). The bypass procedure permits a court of competent jurisdiction
to approve the abortion without parental consent if the court finds one of three precondi-
tions has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that "the minor is mature
and sufficiently well informed to make the decision to have an abortion without" parental
notification; (2) that "notification would not be in the best interest of the minor"; or (3)
that "notification may led to physical, sexual, or emotional abuse of the minor." Id.
§ 33.003(h).
9. Id.§ 33.003(h). A nearly identical deadline applies to the decision of the court of
appeals. Id. § 33.004(b). If the minor's application is denied by the trial court and that
decision is affirmed by the court of appeals, the minor has the right to an "expedited confi-
dential appeal" to the supreme court. Id. § 33.004(f).
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ure to meet the statutory deadline means the application is deemed to
have been granted' ° and is the basis for the statute's third exception to
the parental-notification requirement."
In In re Jane Doe 10,12 the trial court denied the minor's application by
placing the word "No" next to two of the three grounds that would sup-
port granting the application, leaving blank the third ground (relating to
the possibility of sexual, physical, or emotional abuse if the parents are
notified) and placing a check mark next to the words, "The application is
denied."'1 3 In addition to not ruling on the abuse prong, the trial made no
written findings of fact or conclusions of law as to any of the bases for
bypass.
On appeal from the appellate court's affirmance of the trial court's de-
nial of her application, the minor argued that the trial court's failure to
enter the mandatory findings and conclusions within the two days meant
that her application should be deemed granted. The supreme court
agreed 14 as long as the minor had introduced at least "some evidence" of
the potential for abuse. 15 The supreme court extended its earlier holding
in In re Jane Doe16 and ruled that the omitted ruling, finding, or conclu-
sion will be deemed to have been found in the minor's favor if there is
"some" evidence-more than a scintilla-to support the omitted find-
ing.' 7 The supreme court reviewed the minor's uncontradicted testimony
with respect to the possibility of physical or emotional abuse and con-
cluded that she had met the low evidentiary burden of "some evidence"
and reversed the court of appeals.
This was not the first time a trial court failed to make findings and
conclusions in support of its ruling, and a somewhat impatient supreme
court repeated its "admonishment" to the lower courts that findings and
conclusions are mandatory under the statute, and that "particularized
findings [are required] when credibility or maturity issues are involved."
'18
In the next parental-notification case to come before it, the supreme
court's impatience must have turned into astonishment. The trial court in
10. Id. § 33.003(h).
11. Id. § 33.002(a)(3).
12. In re Jane Doe 10, 78 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. 2002).
13. Id. at 340.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 341.
16. In re Jane Doe, 19 S.W.3d 346, 357 (Tex. 2000).
17. In re Jane Doe 10, 78 S.W.3d at 341, 342. In Jane Doe, the trial court ruled against
the applicant on the "mature and sufficiently well informed" prong of the bypass statute.
The court specifically found that the minor was not sufficiently well informed and made no
finding as to her maturity. 19 S.W.3d at 356. The supreme court held that on appeal, the
applicant is entitled to a finding that she is mature as long as there is some evidence in the
record on that issue. Id. at 357. Thus, in Jane Doe, the supreme court applied the "some
evidence" rule to an omitted element in the first prong of the judicial bypass statute. In
Jane Doe 10, the court applied the rule to an entire prong, holding that it would deem the
abuse prong to have been established, in the absence of a ruling or a finding on that prong,
as long as there was some evidence in the record as to the potential for sexual, physical, or
emotional abuse if the applicant's parents were notified. 78 S.W.3d at 341.
18. In re Jane Doe 10, 78 S.W.3d at 343.
2003] 1769
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In re Jane Doe 1119 never ruled on the merits of the minor's application.
Instead, on the day of the evidentiary hearing, the court "sua sponte con-
cluded that the parental bypass law was unconstitutional on various
grounds. °20 The supreme court reminded the district court that it had
ruled more than two years earlier that trial courts should not raise and
decide constitutional issues sua sponte, especially in judicial bypass pro-
ceedings, and that the supreme court expected lower courts to follow its
rulings, not disregard or criticize them.
21
B. HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
In 1999, the legislature enacted section 101.201(b)(4) of the Texas Oc-
cupations Code, 22 which prohibits testimonials in advertising by health
care professionals. The attorney general reviewed the law and concluded
that "[a]lthough we cannot definitively conclude as a matter of law that a
blanket ban is unconstitutional, we believe it is highly likely that a court
would so conclude."
23
The attorney general noted that the United States Supreme Court has
held that professional advertising is a type of commercial speech and is
entitled to some protection. The government can regulate commercial
speech that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. Although section
101.201 deems all testimonials to be inherently misleading, the attorney
general concluded that health-care testimonials do not concern an unlaw-
ful activity and have not been shown to be inherently misleading.24 Ac-
cordingly, the government can regulate testimonials by health
professionals only if the state satisfies the three-part test laid down by the
United States Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission of New York:25 (1) "The State must assert a
substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech,"
(2) "the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved," and
(3) "the governmental interest could [not] be served as well by a more
limited restriction on commercial speech.
'26
Even assuming the state could satisfy the first two prongs of the Central
Hudson test, the attorney general concluded that the restriction likely
failed the third prong of the test-that the restriction be narrowly tai-
lored.27 Section 101.201 does not define "testimonial" and leaves a
health care professional without any guidance as to its likely scope or
interpretation by a court.2 8 The Occupations Code also does not state
19. In re Jane Doe 11, 92 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. 2002).
20. Id. at 512.
21. Id. at 512-13 (citing In re Jane Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. 2000)).
22. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 101.201(b)(4) (Vernon 2003).
23. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JC-0458 (2002).
24. Id. at 3.
25. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
26. Id. at 564.




who can make a testimonial used in health professional advertising, and
the case law does not support blanket bans on classes of advertising.
29
Finally, a statutory requirement of disclaimers or explanations would be
an effective and more narrowly drawn restriction that could avoid the
constitutional defect in section 101.201.
30
II. PHYSICIANS
A. CERTIFIED NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
In Attorney General Opinion JC-0559, 31 Attorney General Cornyn an-
swered whether the Insurance Code authorizes the Texas Department of
Insurance to examine the records of "approved nonprofit health corpora-
tions" 32 ("ANHC's"), which are regulated by the Texas State Board of
Medical Examiners. The question concerned ANHCs that have a con-
tract with an HMO to provide only medical services that the organiza-
tion's physicians are professionally licensed to provide in exchange for a
capitated payment.
The attorney general began with the observation that ANHCs that pro-
vide health care services on a capitated basis on behalf of an HMO are
not required to obtain a certificate of authority under either the Health
Maintenance Organization Act 33 ("HMO Act") or article 21.52F of the
Insurance Code.34 On the other hand, article 20A.17 of the HMO Act
35
authorizes the department to examine HMOs, and that authority extends
to the examination to those records of a contracting ANHC that are "rel-
evant to its relationship with the health maintenance organization.
36
The department's authority to examine a nonprofit organization depends
only on the existence of a contract between the HMO and the ANHC
and is not affected by the fact that the ANHC's physicians provide only
medical services or that the ANHC is paid on a capitated basis. The
scope of the Department's examination authority extends to patient-care
records (for the purpose of reviewing the quality of health care services
provided) as well as to contracts, books, and other records that relate the
29. See id. at 4.
30. See id. The attorney general's opinion is consistent with, and drew support from,
Snell v. Dep't of Prof. Regulation, 742 N.E.2d 1282 (Ill. App. 2001), which still appears to
be the only decided case on this issue.
31. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JC-0559 (2002).
32. Before the codification of the TEXAS HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, "certified non-
profits" (or "5.01(a)'s") were authorized and regulated by the Texas State Board of Medi-
cal Examiners pursuant to § 5.01(a) of the Medical Practice Act, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1999), which has since been codified as TEX.
Occ. CODE ANN. § 162.001-.003 (Vernon 2003). Cf. Thomas Wm. Mayo, Health Care Law,
53 SMU L. REV. 1101, 1101-02 & n.7 (2000).
33. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20A (Vernon Supp. 2002).
34. Id. art. 21.52F (requiring a certificate of authority from the Department of Insur-
ance if ANHC "arrange[s] for or provide[s] a health care plan to enrollees on a prepaid
basis").
35. Id. art. 20A.17.





In the modern era of informed consent, to say nothing of the current
litigation climate, it is rare (and generally unwise) for a physician to
promise or guarantee a particular result. In the 1994 case of Sorokolit v.
Rhodes,38 the supreme court held that when such a promise is made and
the results fall short of what was warranted, the physician may be subject
not only to a claim of medical malpractice, but also to claims under the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act39 ("DTPA") for breach of express war-
ranty and knowing misrepresentation.40 Even when DTPA claims were
properly raised, however, the supreme court "note[d] the possible appli-
cation of the statute of frauds in such cases when properly raised by a
defendant as an affirmative defense."
41
In Smith v. Elliott,42 the El Paso Court of Appeals took up the supreme
court's suggestion. In this case, the physician allegedly promised her pa-
tient that after breast-reduction surgery "her breasts would look good,"
"she would be very pleased with the results," and the results would re-
semble those shown in photographs of previous surgeries performed by
the defendant. 43 Instead, after the surgery there was significant scarring
and the patient's breasts and nipples were different sizes. After conclud-
ing that the plaintiff had pleaded valid DTPA claims for misrepresenta-
tion and breach of warranty, the court of appeals ruled that the defendant
had properly raised the affirmative defense of statute of frauds and, fol-
lowing Sorokolit, that the absence of a writing was fatal to her claims.
The plaintiff argued that at least the misrepresentation claim, which she
argued arises in tort, should survive the statute of frauds defense, even if
the breach of warranty claim, which arises in contract, does not.44 The
court of appeals rejected the distinction, which was not supported by the
37. Id. at 8. The opinion also addressed the scope of the department's authority with
respect to an ANHC that has entered into a delegation contract with an HMO. This part
of the opinion relied upon TEXAS INSURANCE CODE article 20A.18C before it was
amended in 2001 and is relevant only to delegation agreements that were entered into
before January 1, 2002, and have not been renewed after that date. See Op. Tex. Att'y
Gen. No. JC-0559, at 14-20.
38. Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. 1994).
39. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. ch. 17 (Vernon 2002).
40. Sorokolit, 889 S.W.2d at 242-43. In its post-Sorokolit rulings, the supreme court
has consistently narrowed its holding in Sorokolit, frequently finding that DTPA claims
were simply medical malpractice claims masquerading as deceptive practices claims , in
violation of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act, which prohibits DTPA
suits based upon the physician's negligence, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 12(a)
(Vernon Supp. 2003); see, e.g., Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. 1999) (holding that
alleged deceptive practices were merely attempts to recast medical malpractice claims);
MacGregor Med. Ass'n v. Campbell, 985 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. 1998) (same); Gormley v. Stover,
907 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. 1995) (same); Walden v. Jeffrey, 907 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1995) (same).
41. Sorokolit, 889 S.W.2d at 243 n.5.
42. Smith v. Elliott, 68 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, pet. denied).
43. Id. at 845.
44. Id. at 847.
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A. TEXAS HEALTH CARE INFORMATION COUNCIL
1. Confidentiality
The Texas Health Care Information Council ("THCIC") is charged
with developing "a statewide health care data collection system to collect
health care charges, utilization data, provider quality data, and outcome
data" and disseminating it for the benefit of employers, other health-care
consumers, and health-care providers. 46 Covered hospitals must submit
discharge data to the council, including: the individual patient's name,
birth date, address, sex, race, ethnicity, and social security number; infor-
mation about admission, diagnosis, surgical procedures, charges, and
source of payment; certain accounting information, the name and number
of the attending physician and the operating or other physician, and the
name and address of the facility.47
In 2001 the legislature enacted chapter 181 of the Texas Health and
Safety Code,48 which requires hospitals to obtain written authorizations
from patients prior to sending statutorily required confidential identifying
information to THCIC. In response, the Executive Director of THCIC
requested an opinion from the attorney general on the issue whether a
reporting hospital must obtain the written consent of patients whose data
are reported to the THCIC before the hospitals can submit the required
information. The attorney general's answer was no.49
After concluding that a reporting hospital is a "covered entity," the
opinion observed that chapter 181 allows certain disclosures of health in-
formation without the patient's written authorization:
A covered entity may use or disclose protected health information
without the express written authorization of the individual for public
health activities or to comply with the requirements of any federal or
state health benefit program or any federal or state law. A covered
entity may disclose protected health information: (1) to a public
health authority that is authorized by law to collect or receive such
information for the purpose of preventing or controlling disease, in-
jury, or disability, including the reporting of disease, injury, vital
events such as birth or death, and the conduct of public health sur-
45. Id. at 847-48. The statute of frauds provides that the requirement of a signed writ-
ing applies to "an agreement, promise, contract, or warranty of cure relating to medical
care or results thereof made by a physician or health care provider . TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(8) (Vernon 2002).
46. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 108.006(a) (Vernon 2001).
47. 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1301.19(e) (2002). See also id. § 1301.12(a) (hospitals
shall submit discharge files on inpatients).
48. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. ch. 181 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
49. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JC-0508, at 1 (2002).
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veillance, public health investigations, and public interventions .... 50
Based upon this express exception, the attorney general concluded that
reporting hospitals need not obtain the prior written consent of their pa-
tients to report identifiable health information covered by the THCIC
reporting statute.
51
2. Hospitals' Right to Review
Another question submitted to the attorney general by THCIC's exec-
utive director asked whether THCIC must provide a hospital with an op-
portunity to review and comment on certain data as well as the agency's
analysis of that data before THCIC may release them in response to a
request for information about the hospital.52 THCIC's opinion request
was prompted by two requests for information, one "from a legislator 'for
hospital-by-hospital admissions for treatment relating to trauma inci-
dents,' and the other from a member of the public regarding the number
of deaths at a particular hospital in 1999 and 2000."
53
The attorney general began by noting that the THCIC statute requires
the council to notify the reporting hospital if it receives a request for pub-
lic use data about that provider. 54 The statute also "requires the council
to allow a hospital to submit written comments regarding any specific
public use data to be released concerning the hospital. ' 55 These provi-
sions "apply whether or not the public use data is released in a report.
56
In addition, the attorney general concluded that the release of THCIC's
summaries or analyses of "public use data" should be treated as a "re-
port" within the meaning of the statute, which provides that "a report
issued by the Council shall include a reasonable review and comment pe-
riod for the affected providers before public release of the report. ' 57 The
attorney general concluded that "'public release' means the release of a
report to anyone or any entity other than the [THCIC] and affected prov-
iders, including another agency or a legislator."'58
50. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JC-0508, at 4 (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 181.103).
51. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JC-0508, at 1. The remainder of the attorney general's
opinion considered the preemptive effect of the federal privacy rule on Texas' scheme. But
after the release of the attorney general's opinion, the Bush Administration eliminated the
requirement that patients execute a prior written authorization before their health infor-
mation may be released, thus eliminating the preemption problem. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of
Health & Hum. Servs., Fact Sheet: Modifications To The Standards For Privacy Of Individ-
ually Identifiable Health Information-Final Rule (Aug. 9, 2002), available at http://www.
hhs.gov/news/press/2002pres/20020809.html (last accessed March 23, 2003).
52. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JC-0545 (2002).
53. Id. at 2 (quoting Letter from Jim Loyd, Executive Director, Texas Health Care
Information Council, to Honorable John Cornyn, Texas Attorney General 1 (Mar. 21,
2002) (on file with the Opinion Committee)).
54. Id. at 6 (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 108.011(e)).
55. Id. at 7 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 108.011(g)).
56. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JC-0545, at 7.
57. Id. (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 108.011(f)).
58. Id. at 8-9.
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B. LIABILITY FOR CREDENTIALING DECISIONS-EXPERT'S REPORT
The plaintiff in Rose v. Garland Community Hospital59 underwent sev-
eral cosmetic surgeries that left her with painful and unsightly scarring
around her face, breasts, abdomen, and other parts of her body. Subse-
quently, she sued her surgeon and the hospital. Rose alleged the hospital
was negligent in its credentialing of the surgeon who operated on her.60
The hospital moved to dismiss on the ground that Rose had not made a
good faith effort to comply with the requirement in the Medical Liability
and Insurance Improvement Act ("MLIIA") that she timely file an ex-
pert report.61 The plaintiff argued unsuccessfully that her negligent
credentialing claims were not "health care liability claims" that are gov-
erned by the MLIIA, and the trial court granted the hospital's motion to
dismiss. The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed.
The court of appeals noted that not every claim asserted against a
health care provider is a health care liability claim subject to the require-
ments of the MLIIA. 62 To determine which claims are within the scope
of the statute, the court asked: Is the factual basis for the claim an insepa-
rable part of the rendition of care to the plaintiff such that the claim re-
quires a determination of whether a health care provider failed to meet
the applicable standard of medical care? 63
The court concluded that the negligent-credentialing claim did not fall
within the MLIIA because the credentialing process is not performed
during a patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement, but occurs
separate from a patient's medical care and before a physician can treat a
patient in the hospital.64 Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that
the plaintiff's credentialing claim against the hospital is not governed by
the MLIIA and no expert's report was required. 65
59. Rose v. Garland Cmty. Hosp., 87 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.).
60. Id. at 189.
Specifically, [the plaintiff] alleged the hospital was negligent because it (i)
allowed the doctor to perform and continue to perform surgery, (ii) en-
trusted the operating room and equipment to the doctor, (iii) recommended,
granted, renewed, and continued the doctor's staff privileges, (iv) failed to
deny or suspend the doctor's staff privileges and perform a reasonable inves-
tigation, and (v) failed to perform a reasonable investigation into the back-
ground, qualifications, history of surgical cases, and history of serious
malpractice before recommending, granting, renewing, and continuing the
doctor's staff privileges at a time when it knew or should have known the
doctor was a reckless and careless physician and constituted a threat to his
patients' safety.
Id. at 189 (footnote omitted). Additionally, she alleged the hospital was vicariously liable
for the doctor's negligence on a variety of agency theories. Id.
61. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 13.01 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
62. Rose, 87 S.W.3d at 191.
63. Id. at 191 (citing Sorokolit, 889 S.W.2d at 242; Bush v. Green Oaks Operator, Inc.,
39 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.) citing Walden v. Jeffery, 907 S.W.2d
446, 448 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam)).
64. Id. at 192-93.
65. Id. at 193.
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C. OUT-OF-STATE HOSPITALS AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In Townsend v. University Hospital,66 Julia Caren Townsend Olivares
came to Mesquite Medical Center complaining of shortness of breath and
coughing up blood. The examining physicians deemed her condition too
serious to be treated there and transferred her to Medical City of Dallas.
Dr. Weill, her examining physician at Medical City, reached the same
conclusion as Mesquite Medical Center and transferred the patient to the
Pulmonary Hypertension Center at University Hospital - University of
Colorado ("UCH") in Denver, where the patient died five days later.6
7
The patient's survivors sued UCH, the University of Colorado Health
Sciences Center, six physicians, and the individual members of the Insti-
tutional Review Board for UCH (collectively "the Colorado defend-
ants"). The action was filed in Dallas County.68 The Colorado
defendants filed a special appearance and contested personal jurisdiction.
The trial court agreed with the Colorado defendants and dismissed all
claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. 69
On appeal, the plaintiffs had two main arguments. First, they con-
tended the Colorado defendants were subject to "specific jurisdiction"
based upon their acceptance of the referral of a Texas resident and their
treatment of her. The court studied the Colorado defendants' contacts
with Texas and determined they were insufficient to satisfy specific
jurisdiction:
The Colorado defendants all practiced in Colorado, none owned
property or paid taxes in Texas, none were licensed to practice
medicine in Texas, none advertised services in any Texas newspaper,
magazine, telephone book, or other print media, or on any Texas
radio or television network. All patients seeking treatment from the
Colorado defendants traveled to Colorado; none of the Colorado de-
fendants traveled to Texas or any other state to render care. All of
the care received by Olivares by the Colorado defendants occurred
in Colorado. . . . [N]one of the Colorado doctors had any contact
with Olivares before her admission to UCH; the decision to transfer
Olivares to UCH was Weill's independent decision made after con-
sulting with Olivares and other Texas physicians; and no one at UCH
or UCHSC encouraged or influenced Weill to transfer Olivares to
Colorado.... None of the Colorado doctors contracted with Weill or
any other Texas doctor or hospital for the referral of Texas patients.
The Colorado defendants' only contact with Texas was that Olivares
lived in Texas and her body was returned to Texas after her death in
Colorado . . . . Specific jurisdiction over the Colorado defendants
does not arise merely because they treated a Texas resident in their
home state.70
66. Townsend v. Univ. Hosp., 83 S.W.3d 913 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet.
denied).
67. Id. at 918.
68. Id. at 913.
69. Id. at 918.
70. Id. at 920-21.
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Based upon the impressive list of ways in which the Colorado defendants
lacked contacts with Texas, the court of appeals observed, "Out-of-state
doctors should not be subject to jurisdiction simply because the patient
who receives treatment at their office happens to reside and work in
Texas." 7
1
The plaintiffs' second principal argument was that because the Colo-
rado defendants advertised their program and services over the internet,
Texas courts acquired general jurisdiction over them. The court noted
that "[w]hen general jurisdiction is alleged, there must be 'continuous and
systematic contacts' between the nonresident defendant and Texas."' 72
For purposes of establishing general jurisdiction, the court observed that
internet use falls into three groups: (1) "websites clearly used for trans-
acting business over the internet;" (2) "'passive' websites, used only for
advertising;" and (3) "interactive websites. ''73 Because the website con-
tained only contact information and product information, the court of ap-
peals agreed with the trial court that general jurisdiction did not exist. 74
IV. LIABILITY
A. MEDICAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE IMPROVEMENT ACT
1. Prejudgment Interest
Subchapter P of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act
("MLIIA") provides for prejudgment interest on health care liability
claims.75 Subchapter K of the same statute caps awards of damages (other
than those for past or future medical, hospital, and custodial care) against
a physician or health care provider at $500,000, adjusted for inflation.
76
The question for the Texas Supreme Court in Columbia Hospital Corp. of
Houston v. Moore77 was whether the cap in subchapter K applies to the
award of prejudgment interest under subchapter P. The court held that it
does.78
The court closely tracked its analysis in the 2000 case, Horizon/CMS
Healthcare Corp. v. Auld,79 in which the court held that the former gen-
eral prejudgment interest statute-which, like Subchapter P, made no
reference to Subchapter K or its cap-was subject to the Subchapter K
cap in a health care liability case. "[Tihe heart of Auld's analysis contin-
71. Id. at 921 (citing Oden v. Marrs, 880 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994,
no writ).
72. Id. at 922 (citing CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Tex. 1996); Guardian




75. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 16.01-.02 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
76. Id. § 11.02(a) (providing for $500,000 cap), 11.04 (providing for adjustment of stat-
utory cap based upon consumer price index).
77. Columbia Hosp. Corp. of Houston v. Moore, 92 S.W.3d 470 (Tex. 2002).
78. Id. at 474-75.
79. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. 2000).
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ues to apply," wrote the court, "and compels the result we reach today." 80
The court held that the Auld analysis applies to subchapter P for three
reasons. First, prejudgment interest is prejudgment interest, regardless of
whether it flows from the general statute on prejudgment interest or sub-
chapter P. The type of damages authorized by subchapter P is the same
as the type of damages the Auld court said are capped by subchapter K. 81
Second, the court asserted that general statutory purpose of the MLIIA,
and of subchapters P and K in particular, is the same: to limit the dam-
ages liability of health care providers.82 The application of subchapter
K's cap to subchapter P's prejudgment interest provision would further
the general and specific statutory purpose of the MLIIA in the same
manner as the Auld decision did in 2000. And third, a cap is not inconsis-
tent with prejudgment interest, and both subchapter K and subchapter P
can live in perfect harmony.
83
As the three dissenting justices pointed out, however, Auld is not a
perfect guide for the decision because the similarities between Auld and
Moore are more apparent than real. 84 They argued that, unlike the gen-
eral prejudgment statute, subchapter P was enacted later in time than
subchapter K and is the more specific of the two.85 They concluded that
these distinguishing features, in tandem with ordinary principles of statu-
tory construction, support the conclusion that subchapter P's interest
should be exempt from subchapter K's cap. In addition, in a version of
"the dog that didn't bark" argument, the dissent observed that when the
legislature amended the MLIIA and added subchapter P, it was well
aware of the existence of subchapter K but chose not to refer to it-a
clear sign that subchapter K should not be applied to prejudgment inter-
est under the MLIIA.
86
2. Statute of Limitations
In Shah v. Moss, 87 "Ronald Moss sued [Dr. Shah], claiming Shah negli-
gently performed surgery on Moss' right eye and neglected to provide
adequate follow-up treatment." 88 The timeline for the critical events in
the case are as follows:89
80. Moore, 92 S.W.3d at 473.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 473-74. This is easy to understand as to the MLIIA and subchapter K, but
not as obvious as to subchapter P. The court explained that subchapter P excludes pre-
judgment interest on future damages, while the general prejudgment statute allowed inter-
est to accrue on future damages. Id. at 473. Thus, even though the legislature added a new
source of liability when it amended the MLIIA to add subchapter P, the net effect was to
reduce the total damages that had been available prior to the enactment of subchapter P.
83. Id. at 474.
84. See id. at 475-77 (Phillips, C.J., and Baker & Hankinson, JJ., dissenting).
85. Id. at 476.
86. Id. at 477.
87. Shah v. Moss, 67 S.W.3d 836 (Tex. 2001).
88. Id. at 838-39.








The trial court granted Shah's motion for summary judgment, finding
that Moss' claims were time-barred under the Medical Liability and In-
surance Improvement Act.90 The trial court apparently agreed with
Shah's assertion that his treatment was complete after the November
1992 surgery and that subsequent visits did not constitute a continuing
course of treatment but were instead routine periodic checkups. The El
Paso Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits,
holding that the statute of limitations did not bar Moss' action, based on
the court's conclusion that the follow-up visits were part of a continuing
course of treatment and that the two-year limitations period did not begin
to run until the medical treatment was completed. 9'
The supreme court held Moss' claims to be time-barred. First, the neg-
ligent-surgery claim was on a date certain and the court of appeals erred
in applying the course-of-treatment completion doctrine. 92 Subsequent
recheck visits and the yearly exam may have constituted on-going treat-
ment, but that is irrelevant to the negligent-surgery claims where the date
90. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
91. Shah, 67 S.W.3d at 840.
92. Id. at 843.
AY 9, 1991: Dr. Shah first saw Moss after another eye
doctor diagnosed Moss as having a
detached retina.
,E 21, 1991: "Dr. Shah surgically implanted a scleral
buckle to keep the retina in place." Moss
complained of blurred vision and saw a
second specialist, who recommended
removal of the scleral buckle. Shah
advised against removal of the buckle.
ER 28, 1992: Dr. Shah removed the scleral buckle.
MBER 1992: Moss saw Dr. Shah for a follow-up visit.
UARY 1993: Moss saw Dr. Shah for two "one-month
recheck" visits.
MAY 1993: Moss saw Dr. Shah for a "three-month
recheck" visit.
ER 21, 1993: Moss saw Dr. Shah for his final recheck visit;
retina still in place.
ER 22, 1994: During his "yearly exam," Moss complained
of a new "floater" in his vision. Shah dis-
covered that retina had again become
detached.
ER 12, 1994: Shah repaired the second detached retina.
However, Moss still complained of blurred
vision and eventually lost sight in the eye.
-Y 24, 1995: Moss visits Dr. Shah for the last time. Dr.
Shah tells Moss he can do nothing more to
improve Moss' vision.
IL 19, 1996: Moss notified Shah of his malpractice claims.









of the surgery (Nov. 28, 1992) is ascertainable. 93 Thus, the two-year limi-
tations period expired on November 28, 1994, nineteen months before
Moss filed suit.
The court concluded that the final recheck visit, in October 1993, was
the last date on which Shah could have failed to provide adequate follow-
up treatment.94 This follows from the court's conclusion that the Novem-
ber 1994 "yearly exam" was not part of the follow-up treatment for the
November 1992 surgery. Thus, the negligent follow-up claim was time-
barred after October 23, 1995.
95
Four justices dissented. They concluded that, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-movant (Moss), a fact question existed as to
whether the November 1994 exam was part of the follow-up treatment
for the November 1992 surgery.96 Moreover, by the majority's reckoning,
the limitations period began to run on Moss' negligent follow-up claim
before he had suffered injury, a result deemed "anomalous" by the dis-
senters.97 Even with respect to the negligent-surgery claim, the dissenters
disagreed that the negligence occurred on an ascertainable date and
therefore would have applied the course-of-treatment doctrine, pursuant
to which the limitations period begins to run when the course of treat-
ment is complete. Because of the existence of triable fact issues as to the
completion date, the dissenters would have affirmed the court of appeals
as to the negligent-surgery claim as well.98
B. DEATH OF AN UNBORN FETUS
In the 1999 case of Parvin v. Dean,99 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
ruled that the parents of a stillborn post-viability fetus could maintain a
wrongful death cause of action against the driver whose alleged negli-
gence caused or contributed to the collision that produced the in utero
injuries to the fetus. Despite supreme court precedent that is (and con-
tinues to be) directly contrary, 100 the court of appeals held that any inter-
pretation that denies parents a claim based on the stillbirth of their fetus
is unconstitutional.
In Reese v. Fort Worth Osteopathic Hospital, Inc.,10 1 the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals reaffirmed its holding in Parvin and applied it for the
93. Id.
94. Id. at 845.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 848 (O'Neill, J., Phillips, C.J., and Enoch & Hankinson, JJ., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 850-51.
99. Parvin v. Dean, 7 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.).
100. See Witty v. Am. Gen. Capital Distribs., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. 1987) (cit-
ing Yandell v. Delgado, 471 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1971) ("In 1971, we held that live birth was
required for a child to have a cause of action for prenatal injuries. Similarly, where there
has been no live birth, the clear, unambiguous language of the Wrongful Death Act pre-
cludes recovery for the death of a fetus.").




first time to a defendant in a medical malpractice case.10 2 The plaintiffs
in Reese were parents of a viable fetus that died in utero and was stillborn,
allegedly as the result of the negligence of a physician who treated the
mother for rapid heartbeat and dizziness. Plaintiffs sued the physician
and the hospital where the care was delivered both for their own loss and
as legal representatives of Clarence Reese, the stillborn fetus. The trial
court ruled that supreme court precedent barred claims for injury to a
fetus that dies before being born and granted summary judgment to the
defendants. 0
3
The court of appeals affirmed as to the father's medical malpractice
claim because he was merely a bystander, not a patient of either the phy-
sician or the hospital. 10 4 The court reversed as to all other claims: the
mother's own claim for medical malpractice and the parents' claim on
behalf of the stillborn fetus, Clarence.105 The court of appeals stated that
"we find no reason why our holding in Parvin should not apply to cases
involving claims for medical negligence.' a0 6
V. HEALTH CARE FINANCE: REIMBURSEMENT
ACTION BY INSURER
In Bryan v. Citizens National Bank in Abilene,10 7 the leading Texas case
on restitution based upon the payor's mistake of fact, the Texas Supreme
Court described the rule this way: "Generally, a party who pays funds
under a mistake of fact may recover restitution of those funds if the party
to whom payment was made has not materially changed his position in
reliance thereon. ' 10 8 In a subsequent health-benefits case, the Four-
teenth Court of Appeals fashioned an exception to the Bryan rule. In
Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Brown Schools, Inc.,1°9 an insurer
was not allowed to recover overpayments where it had mistakenly paid a
hospital for care after the expiration of benefits. The court of appeals
held that the risk of loss should stay with the insurer when "(1) the over-
payment was made due solely to the insurer's mistake and lack of care;
(2) the hospital made no misrepresentations to induce the payment; and
(3) the hospital acted in good faith without prior knowledge of the
mistake."110
102. Id. at 205.
103. Id. at 204-05.
104. Id. at 206.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 205.
107. Bryan v. Citizens Nat'l Bank in Abilene, 628 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1982).
108. Id. at 763.
109. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. The Brown Schools, 757 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
110. Id. at 413-14, relying on Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 214
N.W.2d 493 (Neb. 1974). Both Lincoln National and Federated Mutual are notable for
their express disavowal that the payee must have changed its position or relied to its detri-
ment in order to avoid liability to the payor for any overpayment. See Lincoln Nat'l, 757
S.W.2d at 413 ("we find a material change of position unnecessary in our analysis of this
case"); Federated Mut., 214 N.W.2d at 495 ("Defendant here was not required to show a
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In Holden Business Forms Co. v. Columbia Medical Center of Arlington
Subsidiary, L.P.,"t' the Fort Worth Court of Appeals adopted the Lincoln
National rule. The case involved an insured who was treated in a hospital
after suffering serious injuries in a high-speed motorcycle crash. After
the insurer paid almost $90,000 to the hospital, it discovered that its in-
sured was intoxicated at the time of the accident, which was the basis for
an express exclusion in the policy. The court of appeals held that, as be-
tween the innocent third-party hospital and the insurer, the risk of loss
should fall on the party in the better position to know that the claim was
not covered by the policy.1 12 The court emphasized that the insurer's
mistake might have consisted solely in its payment of the hospital's claim
with inadequate knowledge as to the applicability of the intoxication
exclusion.
The "lack of care" requirement was not discussed much by the Fort
Worth court, and it is difficult to tell whether the court regarded it to be
an element of the Lincoln National defense. The court did note, how-
ever, that the insurer introduced no evidence that it had sought the in-
sured's medical records. Thus, its argument that it was impeded in its
ability to make a coverage determination by the refusal of the Louisiana
police to release the accident record rang somewhat hollow.
113
change of position in reliance and to its detriment, because it was in the position of a bona
fide purchaser for value"). But see R. Brent Cooper & Michael W. Huddleston, Insurance
Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 329, 377 (1990) ("the [Lincoln National] court held that overpayment to a
third party, as opposed to the insured, could not be the subject of a claim of restitution if
the third party materially changes its position in reliance on the payment"). If a change of
position and detrimental reliance on payment were required, the Lincoln National rule
would be of doubtful applicability to situations in which the hospital was under a state or
federal duty to provide the care, regardless of the availability of insurance or the patient's
ability to pay, as is the case under, e.g., the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000).
111. Holden Bus. Forms Co. v. Columbia Med. Ctr. of Arlington Subsidiary, L.P., 83
S.W.3d 274 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
112. Id. at 278.
113. Id.
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